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Can the Bank of England Do It? 
Dr Jo Michell and Professor Jan Toporowski 
 
This paper examines where the Bank of England goes after the quantitative easing 
that was supposed to overcome the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. We argue that 
there can be no going back to the pre-crisis orthodoxy of inflation-targeting. This 
orthodoxy was incorrectly credited for a period of macroeconomic stability that was 
subsequently shown to be illusory. As a result of QE, the Bank of England now has a 
balance sheet whose running down would deflate the financial system. Instead we 
argue that the Bank should be given an enhanced financial stability mandate in the 
form of a target to conduct open market operations to keep the yield curve stable. 
The history of the Bank shows that these operations in the capital market were 
conducted through most of that history. This mandate will require more explicit 
coordination with the Treasury, but need not eliminate the independence of the 
Bank.  
The main finding in the paper is that, whereas the ability of the Bank to control 
inflation is itself questionable, the effectiveness of the Bank’s open market operations 
in regulating the liquidity of the banking and financial system is demonstrated by 
Quantitative Easing. Given the limitations to the Bank’s power, we caution against 
more fundamental reforms that involve extending the responsibilities of the Bank 
without increasing its capacity to deliver the outcomes implied by those additional 
responsibilities. However, we note that some recent suggestions, such as a higher 
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In 1929 John Maynard Keynes and Hubert Henderson published a pamphlet entitled 
‘Can Lloyd George Do it?’ explaining their challenge to “a fashionable view” in 1924 that 
the economic problems of the time were due to the “impoverishment and 
disorganisation left behind by the [First World] war”. In that erstwhile fashionable 
view, all that was necessary to recover the sunny, predictable comforts of Edwardian 
empires was a stabilisation and return to the monetary arrangements that obtained 
before the war.  
It is similarly argued today, following the ‘shock’ of the 2007 crisis and the recent 
economic stabilisation, that the elimination of all those ‘extraordinary’ fiscal 
interventions and ‘unconventional’ monetary measures is all that is necessary for 
economies to revert to the prelapsarian state of stable economic growth, with low 
inflation steered by independent monetary policy committees. This is expressed by 
the US Federal Reserve’s recent policy of ceasing quantitative easing and driving its 
interest rates back to ‘normal’ levels as employment rises. 
This report argues that such a reversion to pre-crisis central banking is no longer 
possible. Nor is it desirable. The principal reason why pre-crisis central banking is not 
possible is that the Bank of England now has a substantial balance sheet that cannot 
be reduced without adverse consequences for capital markets in Britain. The principal 
reason why pre-crisis central banking is not desirable is that it was precisely that 
model of central banking, restricting monetary policy to the management of short-
term interest rates, that contributed to the crisis that broke out in 2007 and caught 
the Bank of England by surprise. The Labour Party’s review of policy offers an 
opportunity to re-examine how central banks can contribute to stabilising economic 
activity at high rates of employment. 
The report is organized as follows. Sections 1 to 3 briefly recount the pre-
independence history of the Bank of England, highlighting the development of key 
policy tools, and the ways the Bank reacted to historical developments. Section 4 
discusses the period from independence, in 1997, to the outbreak of the financial crisis 
in 2007 and 2008, and describes the institutional structure and modus operandi of the 
Bank at the time the crisis struck. Section 5 examines the response of the Bank to the 
crisis in the form of Quantitative Easing, and argues that this period demonstrates the 
limits of the Bank’s powers. Section 6 puts forward a new, post-Quantitative Easing 
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framework for the Bank, based around stabilization of the yield curve. Section 7 
considers other recent proposals and argues against tasking the Bank with significant 
new responsibilities. Section 8 concludes. 
 
1. The creature of the capital market 
 
The Bank of England was set up in 1694 by Act of Parliament. Its shareholders 
subscribed their capital to help the government of King William III in its war with 
Louis XIV of France. This was more than a patriotic initiative of the Protestant 
burghers of London to save the Glorious Revolution from Catholicism - it was the 
establishment of an institution of lasting benefit to the United Kingdom. The Bank 
was the fruit of a stock market bubble, and its operations since have been 
inseparable from the complex of securities trading in London. John Maynard Keynes 
later told the story as follows: 
“The expedition of Mr. Phipps (afterwards Sir W. Phipps) to recover a Spanish treasure 
ship which was believed to have sunk some fifty years before off the coast of 
Hispaniola, is one of the most extraordinary records of improbable success. He 
returned to London in 1688, having fished out of the sea a sum estimated at between 
£250,000 and £300,000 and paid a dividend of 10,000 per cent (even Drake had only 
distributed a dividend of 4,700 per cent). The excitement and stimulus occasioned by 
this event was the proximate cause of the remarkable stock exchange boom which 
reached its climax in 1692-5 and ended with the foundation of the Bank of England, a 
stock exchange list (with 137 securities quoted) on modern lines, and the reform of the 
currency by Locke and Newton. The stimulus which this gave to home investment 
offset the loss of foreign trade due to William’s French War, and created an 
atmosphere of optimism and prosperity which must have been invaluable for the 
stability of the new regime. The investment boom is of particular historical 
significance in that it was the first of the public utility booms so typical of later periods 
(e.g., the railway booms of nineteenth century) being characterised by a number of 
waterworks flotations.”2 
 
2 J.M. Keynes A Treatise on Money in Two Volumes 2 The Applied Theory of Money London: 




The newly-established Bank operated by investing deposits placed with it, and the 
capital of its shareholders, in government bonds, stocks and shares. The profits on 
such investments were used to pay dividends to the Bank’s shareholders. Fortunately 
the war with France was settled in 1697, and the Bank’s position was strengthened by 
the collapse in 1720 of its rival the South Sea Company which, incidentally, invested far 
more in government bonds. The bursting of the South Sea Bubble gave rise to the 
Bubble Act of that year, which banned the setting up of companies with limited liability 
except by Royal Charter passed by Parliament.  
The Bank of England, like other banks, had the right to issue its own banknotes, but 
had to stand ready to exchange those notes for gold or silver, and eventually just gold. 
This obliged the Bank to hold reserves of gold which, having a fixed price, did not bring 
the bank any profit. This, together with the possibility of a ‘run’ on those reserves if 
too many note-holders turned up at its cash tills to exchange their notes for gold, gave 
the bank its incentive to minimise the issue of its notes, and also to hold a portfolio of 
loans and bonds on which it could earn some return. The system broke down in 1797 
with an unexpected outflow of gold to Paris, where merchants needed it to settle their 
bills in the wake of the collapse of Revolutionary France’s new currency, the assignat. 
Parliament allowed the Bank of England to ‘suspend payments’, or the exchange of its 
notes for gold, at the Bank's request.  
The ‘Suspension’, as it was called, lasted until 1821, after which payments were 
gradually resumed. It gave rise to a golden age of monetary theory in British political 
economy, whose essential ideas still dominate monetary economics today. Expert 
opinion on the proper conduct of the Bank of England came to be divided into the 
Currency and the Banking Schools. The Currency School argued that the note issue of 
the Bank should be restricted to keep the price of gold stable or, in the more extreme 
version, should be restricted to the amount of gold reserves held by the Bank. The 
Banking School, by contrast, argued that the amount of bank notes in circulation 
should be driven by the ‘needs of trade’, and therefore that restriction of bank note 
issue according to gold reserves or conditions in the gold market was an unnecessary 
constraint on business activity. 
The Currency School won out in the short run, with the passing in 1844 of the Bank 
Charter Act, which gave the Bank of England a monopoly on the banknote issue in 
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England, but required the Bank to keep that issue in line with the value of its gold 
reserves, with only a small, ‘fiduciary’ issue to give the Bank flexibility. The significance 
of the Act went far beyond the United Kingdom: the principles of a gold-based paper 
currency were widely discussed and emulated in continental Europe.  
Much less widely discussed was the gradual abolition of the Usury Laws. These were 
originally ecclesiastical laws forbidding the taking of interest, formally banned in all 
three major Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). When Henry VIII 
broke away from the Roman Catholic Church, its canon law on usury was replaced by 
an Act of Parliament placing a 10% ceiling on interest. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, this ceiling had been reduced to 5%. During the French Wars at the start of 
the nineteenth century, the usury laws were criticised for encouraging speculation, 
and were even disregarded by the government in its efforts to encourage buyers of 
government bonds. By the 1820s, the Bank of England had been granted exemption 
from the usury legislation in its discount business, when the Bank would buy and sell 
short-term bills (promises to pay a fixed amount in up to three months’ time) at a price 
below the repayment value of the bills that gave a margin (the discount) equivalent to 
a rate of interest for the period up to repayment.  
The usury laws were eventually abolished in 1844. This appeared to give the Bank of 
England a policy instrument with which to manage its gold reserves: by raising its rate 
of interest on discounts, the Bank Rate, above rates abroad, it was believed that gold 
would be attracted to London and exchanged for notes, which could be used to obtain 
higher returns in the discount and bond markets. Lower interest rates would tend to 
attract bond-issuers to London, and significantly lower rates would cause an outflow 
of gold. 
 
2. The Gold Standard 
 
The passing of the Bank Charter Act and the abolition of the usury laws were followed 
by seven decades of economic growth and stable, or falling, prices, which was widely 
attributed to the gold standard of the Bank of England’s note issue. A more likely 
explanation of this non-inflationary growth is provided by the abolition of the Corn 
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Laws in 1846. The flooding of the British market with cheap grain from the Americas 
in the period up to the First World War not only kept food prices down. With low 
wages, a large share of manual workers’ incomes were spent on food, so that cheap 
grain imports also allowed the real value of wages to rise, even if there was no rise in 
their money value. This fed into growing consumer demand among all classes, except 
rural landowners. Their income from rents was reduced as their tenant farmers’ profits 
succumbed to falling food prices.  
Moreover, despite the formal victory of the Currency School, in the actual practice of 
the Bank of England, it was the Banking School that eventually won out. The growth of 
the British economy in the nineteenth century was characterised by successive 
business cycles, whose recessions were usually preceded by banking crises. Such 
crises tended to arise after booms, during which the growth of trade and a widening 
trade deficit drew gold out of the banking system and into general circulation or 
abroad (the so-called internal and external gold ‘drains’). In such a crisis, the Bank 
Charter Act was commonly suspended, so as to allow the Bank of England to issue 
enough notes to enable commercial banks to settle their obligations to their 
customers. In 1873, the distinguished editor of The Economist magazine, Walter 
Bagehot, published his famous account of the complex of money and financial markets 
in London, Lombard Street. In this book he recommended that, in a crisis, the Bank of 
England should lend freely, but at a penal rate of interest to discourage unnecessary 
expansion of its credit. Inevitably, such lending would require the printing of 
additional banknotes without backing in gold. From that time onwards, the Bank of 
England followed this policy of elastic credit. 
In the 1860s, another challenge had presented itself in the form of the Companies Acts, 
which abolished the Bubble Acts and allowed companies with limited liability to set 
themselves up and issue stocks and shares, subject to having the regulations of a new 
company registered with a Registrar of Companies, to ensure that companies were 
properly run and audited. The stock markets in Britain expanded rapidly, much to the 
relief of the landowning classes who were losing rents from land and feared the loss 
of their gentlemanly status if they undertook paid labour. Finance now offered a new 
kind of wealth from which they could draw income. The nouveaux-riches who thrived 
in the new world of finance found a ready entry into polite society in return for 
adorning the boards of the new companies with titled gentlemen. In this way, 
cosmopolitan finance fossilised antiquarian social hierarchies and gave rise to the 
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distinctive feature of British society in which a largely pre-capitalist upper class 
derives its income and a modern façade from finance.  
The effect of this change on banking was rather more exciting. The proliferation of 
stocks and shares expanded hugely the possibilities of credit creation through what is 
often called financial innovation. Holders (or buyers) of stocks and shares that were 
listed on a stock exchange (and therefore had a market price at which the stocks and 
shares could be bought or sold) found that they could more easily borrow from a bank 
by offering these as collateral. For their part, banks were more willing to lend against 
such security, because they could fit such share or bond certificates conveniently into 
their safes and they knew that, in the event of a default on the loan, they could take 
the security and sell it for cash, or a bank deposit. By this time, bank deposits were 
much more widely used as means of payment among the propertied classes. And banks 
were only obliged to keep a small proportion of their deposits in the form of banknotes 
or gold. If all else failed, they could take their Treasury bills to the Bank of England for 
sale at the Bank’s official discount, or Bank Rate. In this way, the Bank found itself at 
the heart of a system of fractional reserve banking. 
The expansion of banking spelt the end of the gold standard, because it meant that the 
backing of the banknote issue by gold reserves was reduced to a purely formal 
arrangement. Even if there was enough gold to cover the value of banknotes in 
circulation, there certainly was not enough gold or banknotes to cover the much 
greater value of bank deposits that were now used as means of payment. As the 
Edwardian period came to an end, Hartley Withers, Bagehot’s successor as editor of 
The Economist, worried about the possibility of a crisis in the event of a general 
attempt to convert bank deposits into gold or notes, i.e. a general ‘run on the bank’ 
that would overwhelm the reserves of the Bank of England. 
That crisis came with the outbreak of the First World War. With payments from enemy 
countries blocked, and the government undertaking huge expenditures on the war 
effort, gold payments by the Bank of England were suspended for the first time for 
nearly a century. The suspension was supposed to last for the period of the war. But 
the outbreak of peace in 1919 gave rise to an international discussion as to how gold 
payments could be resumed. That discussion occasioned the pamphlet by John 
Maynard Keynes and Hubert Henderson mentioned at the start of this report.  
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In Britain there were two obstacles to a return to the gold standard. During the high 
level of war-time expenditure, prices had more than doubled, and this made Britain’s 
traditional export trade in coal and manufacturing uncompetitive at the pre-War price 
of gold, which would determine the price of those exports in foreign markets where 
the currency was on the gold standard. However, the British government had 
borrowed heavily from abroad during the war, in currencies that remained on the gold 
standard, in order to pay for imports necessary for the war effort. Under the 
settlements agreed at Versailles this debt was supposed to be paid by the Germans. In 
the meantime an exchange rate (price of gold) favourable to exports would raise the 
cost of servicing that foreign debt. A return to the pre-war price of gold would ease 
the cost of that financing. 
Eventually, Britain went back to the gold standard at the pre-War rate in 1925, and the 
Bank of England was given the task of maintaining the fixed convertibility of its notes 
into gold. The efforts of employers and the government to reduce prices in order to 
make exports more competitive and reduce the foreign trade deficit, which was 
draining gold reserves from London, gave rise to widespread strikes and social unrest, 
culminating in the General Strike of 1926. The Bank of England’s contribution was to 
jack up its Bank Rate to a peak of 6.5% in September 1929, in an effort to keep gold 
deposits in London. Shortly after, the New York Stock Exchange crashed, and the 
Great Depression started in Europe and North America. The gold standard was 
abandoned in Britain in 1931, allowing sterling to be devalued. But this, along with the 
reduction in Bank Rate down to 2% by June 1932, did little to alleviate the economic 
depression.  
 
3. The Department of the Treasury 
 
The 1930s ended with the Second World War. By then the Bank of England, and in 
particular its Governor since 1920, Montague Norman, were reviled for their 
preoccupation with keeping Britain on the gold standard and the ineffectiveness of 
their monetary policy. The Bank, it was widely believed, had sacrificed British industry 
in the interests of financial circles in the City of London and foreign investors who 
kept their funds in London. The Bank was owned by private shareholders, although the 
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Government had held shares in the Bank since the First World War. In 1946 the Labour 
Government nationalised the Bank. Thereafter, the Bank of England was formally 
controlled by the Treasury as the official banker to the Government and manager of 
the Government’s debts and its gold and foreign currency reserves. The Bank was also 
responsible for regulating banking, conducting monetary policy, ensuring that the 
official exchange rate against the US dollar was maintained, and administering the 
exchange controls that prevented British residents from holding foreign currency.  
In 1957, the Bank issued a fateful ruling on capital controls that allowed commercial 
banks in London to hold foreign currency deposits for foreign residents. This was the 
Bank’s contribution to the rise of the Euromarkets: that is, markets in currencies 
outside their country of issue. These were free markets whose unregulated foreign 
exchange transactions, and subsequently whose borrowing and lending, fatally 
undermined the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates agreed by Allied 
governments in 1944. By the 1960s, Britain and other countries were experiencing 
increasing difficulties in keeping to the official exchange rates. The Bank was also 
having problems in enforcing domestic credit regulations, which applied only to 
official clearing banks. In 1971, the Bank extended the scope of its regulations to all 
banking intermediaries, under a system called Competition and Credit Control. Banks 
were freed from direct controls over their credit business, restricted now only by 
reserve ratios, which the Bank decided, and by the rate of interest on discounts, or 
Bank Rate, which was set by the government.  
The liberalisation of credit gave rise to a property boom that collapsed in 1974, followed 
by a crash of the stock market, rising unemployment and accelerating inflation. In 1976, 
in the middle of an exchange crisis, the Labour government agreed terms with the 
International Monetary Fund, in which the Bank of England was bound to controlling 
Domestic Credit Expansion in a programme that included reductions in the fiscal 
deficit. The legacy of the old Currency School entered the policy agenda, in the form 
of monetarism (the notion that inflation could be controlled by controlling the money 
supply). When the Conservative government came to power in 1979, the Bank was set 
to controlling the money supply in an effort to reduce inflation, now approaching 25% 
per year, under the government’s Medium Term Financial Strategy. The government 
and the Bank signally failed to achieve the targets for either the money supply or the 
fiscal deficit set in successive versions of that Strategy. Nevertheless, inflation fell, as 
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the labour market was ‘liberalised’ by weakening the scope and influence of organised 
labour, and as public expenditure was reduced in real terms.  
In 1985, the Bank of England participated in a meeting of finance ministers and central 
bank governors of leading capitalist countries, held at the Plaza Hotel in New York, at 
the invitation of the US Treasury, which was concerned by the consequences for 
America’s export trade and international finance of the high value of the US dollar. The 
meeting agreed a devaluation of the dollar in which the Bank of England played its 
part, trading dollars in London. Shortly afterwards, in 1990, Britain entered the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of what was then the European Economic Community. The 
Mechanism was an agreement to keep exchange rates stable within the Community, 
an obvious way to keep prices stable in countries that import a large proportion of 
their consumption needs, energy and raw materials. The Bank was supposed to use 
the government’s foreign exchange reserves and its Bank Rate to keep the exchange 
rate within limits agreed in the Community. However, it became clear that, with Britain 
as an international financial centre open to capital flows from all over the world, the 
Bank had very limited means of fixing the exchange rate. On 16 September 1992 (a day 
that came to be known as ‘Black Wednesday’) the British public were entertained by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont raising Bank Rate from 10% to 12% 
in the morning - an effort to attract foreign currency reserves to London in the 
manner of arbitrage familiar from the Gold Standard days - before announcing in the 
evening that Britain was leaving the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Sterling devalued and, 
the following day, Bank Rate was reduced back to 10%. 
 
4. Independence and Crisis 
 
After such a fiasco, the Bank understandably abandoned pretensions to any high 
profile public role, and retreated to a much more discreet one of implementing the 
monetary policy of the government. When a new Labour government came to power 
in 1997, one of the first decisions of its Chancellor was to reform the Bank and the 
conduct of monetary policy. The Bank was now to set monetary policy, in the form of 
its official interest rate, independently of the government, and to be guided in this by 
a target for inflation. The Bank would no longer operate as the government’s banker 
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and broker for its bond issues. However, this monetary policy ‘independence’ also 
came with the stripping away from the Bank of its supervisory powers, which were 
now devolved to a group of self-regulatory agencies for different kinds of financial and 
banking business, under the overall command of a separate Financial Services 
Authority. The Bank was effectively reduced to little more than its Monetary Policy 
Committee of distinguished economists and Bank officials, which sets interest rates; a 
dealing room that trades securities to make the official rate of interest effective in 
banking markets; and a cashier who manages the (by now minimal) reserves of banks 
in the UK and issues banknotes to those banks, debiting the value of those notes to 
those reserve accounts.  
In the decade following its declaration of ‘independence’, the Bank seemed to be 
fulfilling its mandate to reduce and control inflation by raising its rate of interest when 
its Monetary Policy Committee judged inflationary pressures to arise, and reducing 
that rate if the price level in the economy looked as if it might fall. This was widely 
hailed as a success. At last the Bank appeared to have found a way of operating 
effectively to maintain the value of the money that it issues. Sceptics were less 
convinced by the collective genius of expert opinion in the Monetary Policy 
Committee. They pointed to the traditional factors which had kept inflation low in the 
UK: the overvaluation of sterling, which kept import prices low, and the continuing 
casualization of the workforce, which drove real wages down even as numbers in 
employment rose. Low inflation also spread throughout the industrialised countries 
following the East Asian Crisis of 1997-98, which caused a devaluation of the currencies 
affected and therefore the price of their exports, and China’s admission to the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001, which opened markets in rich countries to cheap 
manufactured imports from East Asia. Over a century ago, amid the turmoil of China’s 
first republican revolution of 1911-12, the great liberal political economist J.A. Hobson 
had prophesied that: “Though certain recent observers are disposed to assign to China 
a slow pace of development in modern capitalistic industry, even a comparatively slow 
advance might exercise a quite appreciable influence upon the investment market and 
the commerce of the world. If any large proportion of this flood of cheap, fairly 
efficient, and rapidly reproductive labour were made available, either by immigration 
or by foreign trade, for competition in the labour market of the world, it might offset 
the whole of the influence (on wages) of the declining birth-rate of the Western 
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peoples. The immediate effect of the effective admission of any large section of China 
into the world-market would be to depress world-prices.”3 
The other flaw in the arrangements established in 1997 was their insouciance in the 
matter of financial stability. Widespread financial difficulties were supposed to be 
dealt with by coordination between the Financial Services Authority, HM Treasury and 
the Bank. Contrary to Bagehot's 'Lender of Last Resort' doctrine, central bankers were 
supposed to avoid involvement. As they were prone to saying in the years before the 
2008 crisis, the profit motive of commercial banks operating in banking markets gave 
those banks superior insight into banking ‘risks’ that government-owned central banks 
could not obtain. 
So it was that in July 2007, when the small Northern Rock Building Society came 
knocking at the door of the Bank with a request to borrow reserves in order to pay out 
to its depositors, the Bank was completely unprepared. The building society became 
the first English bank to collapse since Overend Gurney failed in 1866. British banks 
had followed American practice since the 1980s, regulating liquidity by selling off 
portions of their loan book into the market for long-term securities, a procedure 
known as ‘securitisation’. This worked fine, as long as the capital market was liquid 
enough to absorb such securities. But by the turn of the century, bond markets had 
become much less liquid and banks had increasing difficulty in keeping their asset 
portfolios liquid, as lending into booming markets in real estate caused leverage ratios 
to rise and reserve balances to be squeezed. Northern Rock was merely the first bank 
to run out of liquidity. Large non-financial corporations, which had loaded up with 
bank debt to finance mergers and acquisitions in the expectation of being able to repay 
that debt with the issue of new shares, found themselves similarly embarrassed and 
cut back on their investments in plant and machinery. In this way, the financial crisis 
became a full-scale economic depression. 
The initial problem for the Bank of England was that virtually the only thing it could 
do was vary the rate of interest. On the eve of the crisis, in July 2007, Bank Rate peaked 
at 5.75%. As the crisis proceeded, the rate was rapidly reduced (by March 2009) to 
0.5%, its lowest rate in history.  
 
3 J.A. Hobson Gold, Prices and Wages with an Examination of the Quantity Theory London: Methuen 
1913, pp. 136-137. 
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5. Quantitative Easing  
It was the ineffectiveness of these changes that caused the Bank of England to resort 
to a much older tactic, namely open market operations, or buying securities. This was 
now called Quantitative Easing, and is advertised on the Bank of England’s website as 
follows: “by creating... ‘new’ money, we aim to boost spending and investment in the 
economy”.4 In November 2009, the Bank announced that it would buy £200bn of 
bonds. This had meagre effects (see below). So, in July 2012, the Bank announced 
further buying to bring this up to £375bn of bond purchases. Then, in November 2016, 
as the economy started to slow in the wake of the referendum on EU membership, the 
Bank announced another bout of purchases to bring the total to £435bn of bonds. To 
put these purchases into perspective, this quantitative easing amounts to some 20% 
of the UK’s annual national income, or almost a quarter of the total government debt 










Table 1. Holders of UK government debt (gilts), end September 2018 5. Source: Bank of 
England, ONS and authors’ calculation 
 
4 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/quantitative-easing 
5 This table and following figure underestimate slightly the gilt holdings of the Bank of England relative 
to other sectors because of differences in accounting conventions in the data. APF figures are at 
historical purchase price while all other series are at market value. 
Holder £bn of 
total 
UK banks excluding BoE APF 170 8% 
BoE Asset Purchase Facility (APF) 435 23% 
Other Financial Institutions 156 8% 
Insurance and Pension Funds 601 32% 




Figure 1. Holders of UK government debt securities (gilts) 
Source: Bank of England, ONS and authors’ calculation 
How does quantitative easing work? Despite the commonly-held view that the Bank is 
‘printing money’ to put into circulation in the economy, in fact very few additional 
banknotes are actually printed. The bonds that are bought by the Bank are 
overwhelmingly held by pension funds, insurance companies, banks, other central 
banks, and a few wealthy individuals. When the Bank buys bonds from them, it pays 
for the bonds by crediting the reserve accounts of the commercial banks whose 
customers have sold the bonds, with the amount agreed as payment for the bonds. 
The banks now hold additional reserves as assets, and they expand by an equivalent 
amount the deposits of their customers who sold the bonds. The balance sheet of the 
banking system has expanded, but the public (i.e. households and firms) are no better 
off, in the sense that they (or the pension funds and insurance companies holding their 
wealth) have the same amount of assets or wealth as before. The only difference is that 
some of their bonds have now been swapped for bank deposits. No one has more 
wealth, and no one’s income has increased, at last as a result of first round effects.6 
The longer term effects of the policy on wealth distribution are harder to gauge, but, 
 
6 In the case of bonds sold by commercial banks, there is no increase in the size of commercial banks’ 
balance sheets since, on their asset side, they just swap bonds for reserves at the central bank. 
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to the extent that QE was responsible for raising asset prices, it led to capital gains for 
those who already held financial wealth.  
Seeing how quantitative easing works gives a clue as to the effects and the limitations 
of quantitative easing. In the first place, quantitative easing expanded the balance 
sheets of banks and made them more liquid: banks held larger balances in their reserve 
accounts at the Bank of England, that they can use for drawing banknotes or making 
payments on behalf of their customers to other banks. This ensured that the liquidity 
shortage that had driven Northern Rock out of business could not reoccur. Secondly, 
pension funds, insurance companies, and other investment intermediaries that hold 
financial wealth for wealthy individuals found themselves with more liquid asset 
portfolios, i.e. portfolios in which the share of bank deposits was now higher. Given 
the virtually zero rates of interest available on deposits, the best use to be made of 
those new bank deposits was the purchase of longer term securities. The renewed 
buying of stocks and shares has driven up stock market prices by around a third since 
the start of the buying programme. When bond or share prices rise, their market yield, 
or the return on them in proportion to their market price (the amount of income 
obtained per pound of market value) is reduced. Financial investors therefore are more 
inclined to look elsewhere for better returns. A third outcome of quantitative easing 
in Britain, but also in the United States, Japan, and the Eurozone, was an outflow of 
funds to emerging markets. Governments and companies in developing countries, that 
only a few years before had been regarded as too unreliable and crisis-prone to be 
credit-worthy, found themselves able to borrow on good terms in the international 




Figure 2. The yield curve on UK government debt. The top pane shows the yield (interest 
rate) on the full range of maturities (borrowing durations) between 6 months and 20 
years. Note the tendency of the curve to ‘invert’ before recessions and crises, for 
example, in the late 1980s, the early 2000s and before the 2008 crisis. The bottom panel 
shows selected maturities for a shorter recent time period. Source: Bank of England and 
authors’ calculation. 
Quantitative easing therefore repaired the problem of illiquidity in bank balance 
sheets. This was accompanied by a fall in yields on long-term securities, flattening 
the yield curve, which shows the (interest) cost of finance at different maturities, 
from the rate of interest on overnight borrowing, to the rate that is paid on 
borrowing for 30 years or more (see Figure 2). But as mentioned at the start of this 




Government expenditure can be excluded from this ‘spending’ since it is driven by 
policy and therefore should be largely unaffected by changes in financing conditions. 
In any case, after a brief fiscal stimulus under the Labour government of Gordon 
Brown, government expenditure was committed from 2010 to austerity in order to 
reduce the fiscal deficit. This leaves household consumption and business 
investment as other categories of expenditure in the economy that may be affected 
by QE. Household consumption does not change much because the bulk of it is 
regular, customary expenditure that people try to maintain whatever are the 
conditions in the financial markets. Quantitative easing did not create any additional 
incomes for households, and the increase in household wealth arising from higher 
stock market prices affected only a small proportion of already very wealthy 
households. These households are so rich that their consumption expenditure is 
unconstrained, and therefore little affected, by the value of their asset portfolios, 
limiting the size of any "wealth effects" on consumption. To the extent that monetary 
policy supported household expenditure, it is likely to have been by ensuring that 
banks were not constrained by shortages of liquidity in offering credit to individuals 
to support house purchases and consumption. 
The case of business investment is different. Companies invest in productive 
capacity because they have customers at their door. The rate of interest merely 
affects how they finance any investment that they may undertake. Hence the Bank of 
England’s rate of interest has rarely influenced investment significantly. If anything, 
the two variables - the rate of interest and the rate of business investment - tend to 
move up and down together over the business cycle, rather than inversely, as argued 
by those who believe that lower rates of interest will increase investment, and higher 
ones will decrease such expenditure. Such an investment boom did not arise in 
2008-09, when the Bank of England cut its rate dramatically from 5.75% to 0.5%. 
Quantitative easing too did not bring any additional customers to the doors of the 
non-financial businesses that do the bulk of private sector investment in Britain. Any 
additional customers were the government agencies undertaking the infrastructure 
works, notably in transport infrastructure, that have been a feature of recent 
government efforts to revive the economy. What quantitative easing did was to alter 
the terms of financing for companies, by easing the switch from short-term finance 
to long-term finance. It was the illiquidity in the market for long-term finance that 
had caused the initial decline in business investment around 2008. That initial 
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decline has been reinforced in Britain by the fear of loss of European customers 
following the EU referendum in 2016.  
 
Figure 3. UK money supply and bank lending. 
Source: Bank of England, ONS, and authors’ calculation. 
Quantitative Easing also demonstrated the failure of the doctrine that changes in ‘base 
money’ drive bank lending and therefore also drive changes in bank deposits or ‘broad 
money’. Sometimes referred to as the 'money multiplier’, and still found in 
undergraduate economics textbooks, this doctrine argues that increases in reserve 
balances at commercial banks as a result of open market operations will be ‘multiplied 
up’ into increases in bank lending, and therefore to new deposits that are created when 
banks make new loans. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of QE on bank balance sheets and bank lending. In 2007, 
reserves held by commercial banks at the Bank of England amounted to less than 2% 
of GDP. As a result of QE, this rose to over 20% of GDP by 2018. Over the same period, 
outstanding bank lending as a share of GDP declined as banks deleveraged, while 
deposit balances remained stable. 
What this demonstrates is that the quantity of ‘broad money’ held by the public, mostly 
bank deposits, is not determined directly by the central bank, but is instead the 
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outcome of commercial bank lending decisions and the structure of their balance 
sheets. While operations such as QE increase the liquidity of bank balance sheets, 
whether this translates into greater bank lending is dependent on a range of other 
factors. It is notable that while early Bank of England communications discussing QE 
highlighted the "bank lending channel" of monetary policy, this was downplayed in 
later communications, since evidence of the functioning of this mechanism failed to 
materialise. 
 
6. No going back 
 
The monetary policy of the Bank of England has not been without its disadvantages. 
While the effectiveness of quantitative easing at stimulating investment spending and 
aggregate demand has been limited, a flattening yield curve introduces potential new 
problems for the financial system: it reduces the profits of banks, raising concerns 
about financial disintermediation; and it reduces the incentives for dealers in 
securities markets to provide liquidity by using their balance sheets to counteract 
volatility in interest rates and asset prices. Extremely low long term interest rates 
threaten the solvency of pension funds, because returns from their investments are 
often too low to cover their pension liabilities. This further encourages investment 
funds to invest, indirectly if this cannot be done directly, in more risky speculative 
ventures or in emerging markets offering higher rates of return but also with much 
higher exchange rate and default risk. In turn, such risky investments impair the 
quality of the assets backing our pensions and insurance policies. 
With a growing awareness of the threats posed to financial stability by continuing 
quantitative easing, discussion of monetary policy is dominated by the question of how 
QE may be discontinued so that the old consensus monetary policy framework may 
resume. However, such a return to the status quo ante would be wrong.  
Abandoning the open market operations of quantitative easing would reduce the 
liquidity of the capital market. The Bank of England has to decide what it is to do with 
the portfolio of securities built up through successive quantitative easing 
programmes. If the Bank sells its portfolio of securities, the sale will drain existing 
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liquidity out of the banking system and capital markets: those financial investors who 
buy the government bonds (probably institutional investors anxious to buy top quality 
securities at a better market yield) will hand over their bank deposits in payment for 
the bonds, and their banks will hand over equivalent reserves to the Bank to be 
cancelled. Even if the Bank merely announces its intention to sell, the effect on asset 
prices will be to raise the cost of longer-term financing. If the Bank merely ‘runs down’ 
its portfolio, receiving the interest and eventually the repayment on maturity of the 
bonds without purchasing new bonds to replace them and maintain the level of QE, it 
is relying on the government to run a financial surplus to make those payments. Such 
a financial surplus can either be obtained by running a fiscal surplus, or by the 
government issuing more bonds, thereby draining the liquidity in the capital market. 
Whether the government or the Bank sells bonds, the effect is the same: a deflation of 
the capital market that will create problems for government finances and corporate 
finance, both of which need to be mobilised in order to overcome the low investment 
and slow economic growth that is the proximate cause of the rise in government debt 
and the fragility of business finances. 
A new policy framework is needed, building on QE and using central bank open market 
operations to regulate liquidity in a capital market that is now globalised. The Bank 
should start by acknowledging that a return to the pre-crisis status quo is neither 
possible nor desirable. The Bank cannot avoid playing an active role in longer term 
bond markets for the foreseeable future. An implication is that the Bank will have 
direct influence not only over short term rates but also over the shape of the yield 
curve. The Bank should acknowledge this by explicitly including control of the yield 
curve as part of its operating framework. The Bank of Japan has been doing this since 
2016, and yield curve control is now being openly discussed in relation to the Federal 
Reserve.7 
Implementation of a system of yield curve management will require careful design, 
and the full details of such a system are outside the scope of the current document. 
The Bank will need to balance the requirements of maintaining financial stability with 
macroeconomic objectives. Some general principles can, however, be suggested. 
 
7 Clarida et. al., 2018, The Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control Policy, Columbia School of 




The Bank should commit to publishing forecasts of the yield curve over its policy 
horizon. It should discuss the implications of these forecasts for financial institutions, 
in particular pension funds and insurance funds, and for financial stability more 
broadly. The Bank should commit to ensuring that the yield curve will not deviate 
substantially from these forecasts over a stated time horizon. Within stated limits, the 
Bank should allow the normal functioning of the market to determine the yields on 
long term assets, but the Bank should stand ready to become a ‘market maker’ in key 
bond markets should liquidity dry up, or if buying or selling of these assets were to 
exceed amounts consistent with Bank forecasts. These interventions should not be 
limited to the markets for government debt, but would also include liabilities of British 
corporations that are willing to have the market for their long-term securities 
regulated by the Bank. This would also give the Bank some control over those 
corporations’ merger and acquisition activities. The idea is not so outrageous or 
Bolshevist. This kind of policy framework was used informally in the nineteenth 
century when capital markets were globalised under the gold standard. Central banks 
then made a market in the bonds issued by their government and had formal and 
informal lists of corporate securities that they would accept for discount.  
There are number of advantages to such a commitment. The Bank of England already 
acknowledges that it must sometimes assume the role of ‘market maker of last resort’ 
as part of its emergency procedures. 8 The inclusion of corporate bond purchases in 
the Bank’s quantitative easing programme is a tacit acceptance that it must now also 
take this role as part of the normal setting of monetary policy. In the modern system 
of globalised finance, with liquidity obtained and distributed on the basis of 
collateralised borrowing, such a framework would limit the price volatility of those 
financial assets used as collateral. In many cases, this is a more effective way of 
ensuring the liquidity of capital markets and financial institution balance sheets than 
providing central bank reserves directly to a subset of financial institutions. It provides 
certainty that a wide range of capital market participants can routinely obtain liquidity 
if needed, using assets held on their balance sheets as collateral.9 
A more explicit commitment to this role would provide greater certainty to financial 
institutions, businesses and government when planning investment programmes than 
 
8 The Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/markets/sterling-monetary-framework/red-book 
9 Mehrling (2010), The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
 23 
that provided by forward guidance, the policy of explaining intended future Bank 
actions. It would allow actual financing and investment plans to be made with a 
substantial degree of certainty around the cost and availability of credit. 
Such regulation of capital market liquidity inevitably means that monetary policy 
needs to be coordinated with fiscal policy. The Bank of England will continue to play 
an active role in debt markets, particularly government debt markets, for the 
foreseeable future. This will require coordination with the Treasury. While the Bank 
continues these operations and retains substantial volumes of government debt on its 
balance sheet, monetary and fiscal policy can no longer be cleanly separated. 
Macroeconomic targets should therefore been seen as joint targets for the Bank and 
the Treasury. This need not mean eliminating the independence of the central bank 
and subordinating the monetary policy of the Bank of England to the government. The 
coordination with fiscal policy could be effected by requiring the Bank of England to 
be much more responsible to Parliament for stability in the capital markets: that is, for 
ensuring that there is adequate liquidity so that new securities issued by the 
government and by corporations based in the UK can be absorbed by the market in an 
orderly and predictable way.  
The framework has a number of practical advantages. It would require minimal new 
legislation or new institutions. In return for having the benefit of the Bank of England’s 
liquidity umbrella, British corporations could be expected to show a greater 
commitment to investment in Britain. The stabilisation of the yield curve and the 
regulation of merger and takeover activity would also discourage speculation and 
trading on capital market instability. The stabilisation of the capital market would 
complement and make more effective bank capital adequacy regimes: banks lending 
to businesses with access to more stable long-term funding would improve the quality 
of their loan books. Planning for government investment programmes could go ahead 
without the usual objections that the bond markets may turn against the government. 
 
7. Moving Targets? 
 
Should changes to the Bank’s remit go further still? A number of proposals to change 
or augment the Bank of England's current target of two per cent inflation have recently 
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been put forward. These include an increase in the target rate of inflation, the addition 
of a productivity target, and tasking the Bank with credit guidance and responsibility 
for actions relating to climate change. 
One proposal that has attracted broad support is an increase in the rate of inflation 
targeted by the Bank of England. A revised target of four per cent is often suggested. 
The rationale for the proposal is that the likelihood of undershooting the two per cent 
target was underestimated, and with a two percent band between the target and zero, 
the potential for interest rates to hit the lower bound was likewise underestimated. By 
raising the target to four per cent, there is a substantially wider margin for error in 
undershooting the target before the zero bound is reached, and resort to 
"unconventional" measures such as quantitative easing would be more common. 
One problem with this justification is the implicit assumption of a return to the pre-
crisis status quo, which we have argued cannot be sustained. Another is that, as we 
have also argued above, adjustments to Bank rate only have limited impact on 
expenditure and inflation. This does not mean that the proposal to raise the target is 
without merit. Given the current situation of highly deregulated labour markets, 
wage-driven inflation is unlikely to become a binding constraint on macroeconomic 
performance: financial instability is a greater danger. Inflation is now largely driven by 
the prices of commodities, oil in particular, and by exchange rate movements, as we 
have seen in the wake of the EU referendum in 2016. The dangers of the economy 
running too “cold” therefore substantially outweigh the dangers of marginally higher 
inflation. 
An alternative formulation, put forward by Simon Wren-Lewis, is for the Bank to 
replace its inflation target with a target, ‘to maximise output growth subject to 
maintaining inflation within 1 per cent of its target by the end of a (rolling) five‐year 
period’.10 Maintaining output close to full capacity would stimulate wage growth, 
which in turn should provide firms with the incentives to undertake labour-saving 
capital investment. However, this presupposes that the Bank has ways of positively 
influencing output growth. While such influence is widely believed to be the case, 
there are also reasons to be sceptical of such possibilities. The clearest evidence 
against the view that monetary policy can stimulate output growth is provided by the 
 




course of economic activity since the 2008 financial crisis, when the economy has 
resisted the Banks efforts through quantitative easing and lower interest rates, to 
engineer an economic recovery. 
Nevertheless, this would be a better way to try and address the UK's productivity 
shortfall than to make productivity an explicit target of Bank policy, as argued in a 
recent report commissioned by the Labour Party.11 There are several problems with 
any policy target on productivity. First, productivity is a residual measure. The only 
meaningful measure of productivity is output per unit of labour: GDP divided by 
persons employed or hours worked. The weakness of UK productivity growth since 
the 2008 crisis is the mirror image of rapidly increasing employment alongside weak 
aggregate demand and GDP growth. While growth remains weak, improvements in 
productivity are only therefore likely to be possible by reducing the growth of 
employment, or even creating unemployment. Moreover, productivity and inflation 
tend to move in a contrary fashion, with productivity rising in an economic boom, 
when inflation is rising as well, and falling in a recession, when inflation is falling as 
well. A central bank that simultaneously attempted to target inflation and productivity 
using traditional tools to influence demand would likely find itself pulling in two 
different directions at once. 
Far more effective in raising productivity would be a government programme to re-
equip British industry, in particular the motor-vehicle industry, construction, and the 
transport infrastructure for a zero carbon-emissions future. By raising substantially 
the level of expenditure in the economy, this kind of ‘turbo-charged Green New Deal’ 
would raise labour productivity much more directly and substantially than any indirect 
credit instruments that the Bank of England may have at its disposal. Such a 
programme would also make effective other recent suggestions that climate change 
should play a greater role in central bank policy-making.12 These range from requiring 
central banks to incorporate climate-related risks into their stress-testing regimes, to 
more radical proposals such as excluding bonds issued by carbon-intensive businesses 
from central bank bond purchases and from collateral eligible for discounting at the 
 
11 https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Financing-investment-final-report-combined.pdf 





central bank, and the use of credit guidance to channel funds to green investment 
projects. 
There is good reason to be sympathetic to proposals demanding action on climate 
change. The need for concerted change is undeniable. But we can also question 
whether the Bank of England is suited to a leading role in the major structural 
adjustments necessary for the transition to a low carbon economy. The argument for 
inclusion of climate-related risks in Bank of England stress tests is compelling: 
financial risks arise both from the direct effects of climate change and from the 
process of transition to a lower carbon economy. As Mark Carney recently put it, a 
sudden repricing of carbon-intensive assets could potentially lead to a climate "Minsky 
moment".13 But there are reasons to be cautious on the use of credit guidance and 
capital weights to try and achieve broad social and environmental aims. The Bank of 
England currently has neither the information nor the expertise required to undertake 
credit allocation decisions, and the provision of finance is by no means the same as 
the actual modernization to zero-carbon standards of economic activity. New 
monitoring and assessment capacity could be developed, but it is not clear the Bank is 
the right institutional setting for these activities which would arguably be better 
placed either within or alongside a National Investment Bank. 
Moreover, the use of quantitative targets for credit and monetary aggregates (as 
proposed in the recent Labour-commissioned report) was abandoned (in favour of 
policy implementation based on adjusting interest rates) by all major central banks in 
the wake of the financial volatility resulting from the failed 1980s monetarist 
experiment in directly controlling money supply growth. The proposal to target 
productivity (and thus, implicitly, nominal GDP growth) using quantitative credit 
targets represents a reversion to elements of this monetarist approach. In reality, 
central banks cannot target interest rates and monetary and credit aggregates 
simultaneously. 
A better option would be for the Bank to make liquidity available at preferential rates 
and conditions (such as reduced collateral haircuts) to credit institutions that meet 
particular lending criteria. These criteria, and the identification of financial 






Bank, as part of the government’s industrial strategy. A preferential credit system of 
this type has already been implemented by the European Central Bank: ‘Targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations’ (TLTROs) are loans to credit institutions such that 
conditions are adjusted to reflect the lending patterns of the borrowing institutions. 
Credit institutions that lend to non-financial corporations and households (excluding 
mortgage lending) receive funding at lower interest rates.14 
Implementation in this way avoids the potentially conflicting objectives that would 
result from using capital adequacy as a credit guidance tool. Capital adequacy risk 
weights, and associated macroprudential tools, are intended to reflect the potential 
risks to the financial system and the broader economy originating with financial 
institutions’ balance sheets. Weightings should certainly reflect the risks from climate 
change, but broadening the policy aims of credit risk weighting to include credit 
guidance would lead to the confusion that arises from using a single instrument to try 
and achieve multiple objectives. 
It must also be noted that these initiatives would only affect the financing of credit 
institutions, and thus, hopefully, the financing of socially desirable investment projects 
– but not the decision to undertake the investments, which will continue to depend 
on the profitability of such undertakings, and the degree of excess capacity in industry. 
It should also be borne in mind that, historically, the UK banking system has financed 
little domestic capital investment, focusing instead on domestic mortgage lending and 
overseas activities. Large scale investment has typically been financed with firms’ 
retained earnings or with funds obtained in the capital markets. Generating 
substantial volumes of bank credit for business investment will require substantial 
structural changes to the UK banking system, and will not be achieved simply by 
adjustments to the way that liquidity is provided by the Bank of England. Addressing 
the UK’s productivity problems requires measures that will stimulate business 
investment, raise infrastructure spending, and reverse the wage stagnation of the last 
decade. These are, to a substantial degree, the job of industrial policy, implemented 







8. What Can the Bank Do? 
 
Mark Carney was appointed Governor of the Bank of England in 2012, and is due to 
step down at the start of 2020. At the time of writing, his successor is yet to be named. 
Carney had previously been Governor of the Bank of Canada, where he had had ‘a good 
crisis’ in the sense that the Canadian financial system was little affected by the 2008 
crisis in its neighbour, the United States. In large part, this stronger financial 
performance was because the Canadian banking system is dominated by three large 
banks, a degree of concentration that facilitates banking regulation and had allowed 
the Bank of Canada to dissuade Canadian banks from lending into a property bubble. 
Before his central bank employment, Carney had worked for Goldman Sachs, and he 
therefore has a good understanding of capital markets and international finance. Since 
his appointment he has shown himself a pragmatic strategist at the Bank and an 
articulate spokesman for its policies. 
However, his successor will have to acknowledge that the experience of the Bank of 
England during Carney’s term shows that the Bank of England cannot regulate the 
business cycle, as was intended when the Bank was given its mandate by Gordon 
Brown in 1997. For a decade, the Bank was able to claim for itself an achievement that 
was due to an economic conjuncture outside the scope of the Bank’s influence.15 For 
the next decade, from the financial crisis of 2007, the instruments of monetary policy 
- interest rates and open market operations dressed as a new instrument of 
‘quantitative easing’ - proved unable to prevent deflation in the economy and 
subsequent economic stagnation. The idea that the central bank can control inflation 
and growth had always rested on some dubious economic reasoning that distracted 
policy-makers from an understanding of what central banks can do.  
There is a danger of repeating these mistakes by giving the Bank of England 
responsibilities it cannot fulfill. In reality, central banks’ powers over the economy are 
limited. They can regulate banking, set interest rates across a range of market 
segments and maturities, ensure that there is enough liquidity in capital markets to 
support the financial operations of government and firms, and in a crisis they can flood 
the financial markets with liquidity. This is what the Bank of England can do. The 
 
15 This claim was recently repeated by Bank of England Chief Economist Andy Haldane, who argued 




proper regulation of employment and investment in the economy is a matter of policy 
for Government, not the central bank. 
